Retail competition today can be described by three main features: i) oligopolistic competition, ii) multi-store settings, and iii) the presence of large economies of scale. In these markets, firms usually apply a centralized decisions making process in order to take full advantage of economies of scales, e.g. retail distribution centers. In this paper, we model and analyze the stability and chaos of retail competition considering all these issues. In particular, a dynamic multi-market Cournot-Nash equilibrium with global economies and diseconomies of scale model is developed. We confirm the non-intuitive hypothesis that retail multi-store competition is more unstable that traditional small business that cover the same demand. The main sources of stability are the scale parameter and the number of markets.
Introduction
In an oligopolistic setting under a Cournot scheme [1] , the strategy of each economic player depends on its own quantity decision, and on its rival's reaction. Puu was the first to explicitly show the complex dynamics of the oligopolistic setting under simple assumptions (isoelastic demand function and constant marginal cost) for two and three players [2] [3] [4] . This kind of analysis has grown significantly during the last decade in both, the mathematics and complex systems literature, as well as in the economically-oriented journals.
Indeed, since the Puu's approach, several games has been developed for the study of the market stability, focusing on: different demand or price function [5, 6] , number of players [7, 8] , behavioral assumptions (naive [9] [10] [11] , versus adaptive [12, 13] , bounded rationality [6, 14, 15] or heterogeneous expectations [16] [17] [18] [19] ). In terms of the cost function definition, several developments has been proposed as well, as non-linear cost function [6, 13, 15, 19, 20] , capacity constraints | [13, [21] [22] [23] and some spillover effects [24] [25] [26] [27] .
Most works in this line of research have concentrated in single markets with linear production structures (i.e. assuming constant returns to scale). Nevertheless, oligopolistic competition today seems to present multi-market phenomena and, in some cases, they showcase important economies of scale, especially in the retail industry. Indeed, supermarket chains and retailers of food, gasoline, supplies and services all compete for market share through multi-store formats over geographically separated markets. This localized competition is presented in different levels: city, region, or country. In this context, companies segment their strategies, tailoring their selected outcome for different types of consumers and competitors, which vary by geographical location. On the other hand, on the supply side, multi-market retailers usually try to take full advantages of their size, in other words, their economies of scale. For instance, through the development of distributions centers that attend most of the stores in an specific territory. Thus, as the cost structure of multi-market retails depends on the total volume of the produced goods, the individual cost structure of each store is usually coupled with the whole business. It is important to point out that, this system of production, implies a centralized decisions making process, which become in practice an extremely difficult task. Summing up, retail competition today can be described by three main features: i) oligopolistic competition, ii) multi-store setting, iii) the presence of economies of scale.
Applications of the Cournot scheme into the multi-market problem has been proposed before by economists, for example, in the case of international trade. Some of these works modeled the presence of economies of scale, for the domestic and foreign markets, considering the size (quantity produced) and other properties of firms [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . Thus, for instance in a work of Krugman [30] , a multi-market Cournot model with economies of scale was used to explain the successful performance of Japan as an exporting country at the beginning of the 1980s.
In theoretical terms, the multi-market oligopoly framework was revisited and generalized in the seminal paper by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer [36] . One of their main remarks is that the presence of a multi-store firm in a market may affect the position in the others for the presence of demand and/or supply spillovers. In the same line, Bernheim and Whinston, [37] , show that with scale economies, the multi-market contact may produce "spheres of influence" [38] , that occurs when each of the multi-market competing firms may be more efficient in some subset of these markets and less efficient in others (symmetric advantage) or when one firm is more efficient in all markets (absolute advantage). Despite these multi-market analysis, this literature has focused mainly on the demand side of the problem, not the supply side. Specifically, they refer to multi-market contact, when demands curves recognize substitution and complementarity of different products.
In terms of the analysis of the dynamics of the multi-market Cournot problem, we found only a few papers [39] [40] [41] [42] , focusing on different products and scope.
In this context, this research deals with the analysis of stability and chaos of multimarket competition in the presence of economies and diseconomies of scale, extending this way the analysis of the dynamics of the oligopolistic competition. Thus, we model the main characteristics of the retail competition today, analysing the dynamics and stability of this particular dynamic system, and we compare these results with the stability analysis of traditional small business that cover the same demand, the classic Pu's formulation.
The main hypothesis of the paper is that non-linear cost structures in multi-market setting are important sources of instability in the game outcome. Particularly, we study the stability of a multi-market Cournot-Nash equilibrium with global economies of scale, that is, the scale level that is related to the total production of firms, in all markets, as opposed to local economies of scale presented at each store individually or linear production structures. In this setting, the internal organization of a firm may affect its performances over the markets and the global equilibrium [43] . For example, multi-market firms that buy their products in a centralized manner, storing them in a distribution center, to be redistributed afterwards to their retailers store in all markets usually operate this way to obtain economies of scale in the process of buying and distribution. In this paper, we assume this type of centralized structure where companies takes advantage of their size, under economies of scale, that allow them to decrease the cost structure [44] .
This papers is organized as follows: in section 2 classical models of the Cournot problem are described and extended to the multi-market framework. In the section 3 a Multi-market-Cournot problem is presented, considering interrelated cost structures and economies of scale. In section 4, the study of the stability of the system is addressed and generalized for the duopoly case. In the fifth section, the complex dynamics of the game for different numbers markets and values of the scale parameter are shown by path graphics and bifurcation diagrams. Finally, the main conclusions for this work are presented.
Baseline: Single market oligopoly models
The well-known Cournot-Theocharis model [45] [46] [47] [48] proposed a Cournot Oligopoly model with inverse lineal demand function and constant marginal cost, that is:
where i = 1, . . . , N identify the player, P is the price of the good, C is the total cost and q is the quantity. The profit is obtained subtracting the revenues by total cost:
The optimization problem (maximization of profit) arrives to:
With solution (Cournot-Nash equilibrium point):
In order to transform the static game 2.3 into a dynamic one, the Cournot or naive strategy is used (see Cournot [1] and Puu [2] )
1 . Thus, the long run map as an iterative process is given by:
The dynamical system of N reaction functions defined by 2.4 has a stable equilibrium (fix point) for n ≤ 2 . For n = 3 the equilibrium is neutrally stable (stationary oscillations) and for n ≥ 4 the equilibrium becomes unstable.
A generalization of the Cournot-Theocharis problem was developed by Fisher [49] . This research allows to work with increasing or decreasing returns to scale (i.e., economies or diseconomies of scale). In order to get this result, we need to add a non-linear term to the traditional linear cost function:
Thus, the profit takes the following form:
Some restrictions for avoiding non-negativity of outputs, price, profits and marginal cost are considered: c > 0, a ≥ c and d > −1/2.
Thus, the maximization of the profit (eq. 2.5) leads to the best response of the i thfirm:
Then, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by:
Hence, the naive dynamics takes the form:
Finally, this dynamical system becomes stable when (N − 3) /2 < d . Thus, if there are two players the game has a stable equilibrium
The approaches revised above (Teocharis and Fisher), were design to model a singlemarket oligopoly problem (for example the rivalry between "mom-and-pop" stores). In this case, both the prices and the costs don't depends upon the behavior of the players in other markets, because they did not consider the case of large corporations, with multiple operations in various locations.
In the next section, and taking as baseline the models presented above, we will develop a multi-market Cournot model with economies of scale that will allow us to describe the modern retail competition.
The Model
Let us consider a multi-market oligopoly where N single-product firms compete in M markets. All markets are very far away, so there not exist arbitrage possibilities. Each market has its own price (from a linear demand function). Then, if q i j is the quantity of the i th company at the market j and Q j the market supply, the selling price at the j th market is given by,
We assume a centralized managerial structure, where the production costs depends of the total outputs of each firm. Besides, due both their size and specialization the company can have economies of scale. So we have:
with c i greater than zero. Depending of the value of d the companies operates under economies of scale (d < 0) or diseconomies of scale (d > 0). The allowable range for the parameter d will be analyzed later.
The square form of the production cost was used previously for other scholars in a single-market context [6, [49] [50] [51] . However, for this multi-market scheme we use the nonlinearity for to couple the costs and to enable the existence of economies (diseconomies) of scale. This is a realistic approach for the retails firms, because they produce or buy in large scale.
Under this cost structure, c i > 0 and dQ
max is the maximum level of production of firm i. The theoretical maximum production (extreme case) is achieved when a company becomes a monopoly in all the markets (i.e. Q j = q i j ,∀j). As P j ≥ 0, we have j a j > Q i max , and then we have 2d > c i / j a j . Thus the profit function of each firm depends upon each market price, the quantity sold by the firm in that particular market, and the total cost of the firm, that considers the sum of the global cost and the local cost:
The managerial decision of each firm is to choose the quantity q i j that maximizes its profits. In other words, the i th company which produces a total output of Q i divided over the M different markets according to the output vector Q i = q 
Defining the residual market supply for i asQ 
Clearly, the allocation decision depends on the decision of the other players on this market, and also depends on the participation of the firm in other markets (or the total firm supply). This results is consistent with the Cournot intuition and consistent to previous results for the single-market problem 2 [20, 49, 52] .
In order to keep the game on rails, we have that * q i j is a maximum if and only if d > −1. Also the marginal profit for zero output must be non-negative [49] , so a j ≥ c i , ∀i. This conditions joined with the previous restrictions arrives to:
The profit of each firm at the equilibrium point is given by:
The Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium is given by:
where each one of the N × N entries of J is a M × M block matrix, that represents the change of the i-firm's reaction functions with respect to the outputs of j, with:
According to our optimal outputs (Eq. 3.6), we have:
where I is the identity matrix and H is a zero-diagonal matrix with all the off-diagonal entries equal to −d/(1 + d).
Dynamic Analysis of the Equilibrium
For the dynamic modeling, we use naive expectations. Thus, the game is developed on discrete time as follow 3 :
When there are two players competing over M different markets, the long-run map proposed in 4.1 is defining for the following 2m equations:
. . . . . .
The nontrivial Cournot-Nash equilibrium point for the previous set of equations (static solution) is given by: 3 The dynamic proposed in 4.1 can lead to negative outputs without economic sense. Following [53] , we will differentiate between two types of trajectories: admissible and feasible. Calling T the map defined by the 2m equations of the game, the set of admissible (S) and feasible points (F ) is defined respectively by:
Then, the mathematical results are based on the admissible trajectories. However, in the economic context, only the feasible points will be considered.
Using the equations3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 the Jacobian matrix for the system is defined by:
The characteristic equation of 4.4 takes the form:
Thus, we have four 4 different eigenvalues:
The local stability of equilibrium is achieved only if each eigenvalue is within the unit circle. According to 4.6 this is fulfilled when: 
By 4.7 is clear that stability of the duopoly game depends on both the scale parameter (d) and the number of markets (m). In the fig. 4 .1 the relationship between m and d, in order of to arrive to the stability of the game is shown. When m=1,2 the equilibrium becomes unstable only if d>-1/(2m). However, if m>3, we need to put an upper bound for the stability condition. We see that when the number of markets increases, the stability is achieved only if d tends to zero.
Numerical simulations
Using numerical simulations we can see how the complex dynamics of the equilibrium depends on the scale parameter (d), using a scheme of duopolists competing on three markets (2 × 3 game). The results of our model (blue) will be compared with the base model fig. 5.3b) , we can observe how the centralized managerial decision takes advantage in terms of production when the company operates under economies of scale in relation to the disaggregated model; while at diseconomies of scale, the production performance of the local model are less affected than the multi-market scheme.
Conclusions
In this work, we analyze the stability of a multi-store retail competition model. Specifically, we model an oligopoly system with multi-market competition. The model considers the impact of the firm's economies or diseconomies of scale. In one extreme, the multistore retail maintain a centralized decision making process, optimizing global economies of scale due to its global size. On the other hand, we have local oligopolistic competition, where the same demand is served by different firms that compete in only one market. Our model confirms the fact that economies and diseconomies of scale make the Cournot equilibrium very unstable for certain values of the scale parameter of the producers. Additionally, the number of markets, as expected, tends to contribute to this instability. One very interesting further research is to expand the multi-market oligopolistic model to a multi-product setting. 
